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A mechanism-based approach was developed focusing on the psychodynamic,
psychological and neuronal mechanisms in healthy and depressed persons. In this
integrative concept of depression, the self is a core dimension in depression. It is
attributed to negative emotions (e.g., failure, guilt). The increased inward focus in
depression is connected with a decreased environmental focus. The development
of neuropsychodynamic hypotheses of the altered self-reference is based on the
investigation of the emotional-cognitive interaction in depressed patients. It may be
hypothesized that the increased negative self-attributions—as typical characteristics
of an increased self-focus in depression—may result from altered neuronal activity
in subcortical-cortical midline structures in the brain, especially from hyperactivity in
the cortical-subcortical midline regions and hypoactivity in the lateral regions. The
increased resting state activity in depression is especially associated with an increased
resting state activity in the default mode network (DMN) and a dysbalance between
DMN and executive network (EN) activity. Possible therapeutic consequences of
the neuropsychodynamic approach to depression involve the necessary emotional
attunement in psychotherapy of depressed patients and the adequate timing of
therapeutic interventions. The hypotheses which have been developed in the context
of the neuropsychodynamic model of depression may be used for more specific
psychotherapeutic interventions, aiming at specific mechanisms of compensation and
defence, which are related to the increased resting state activity and the disturbed
resting state-stimulus-interaction.
Keywords: depression, neuropsychodynamic psychiatry, self, resting state, default mode network (DMN),
mechanism-based approach, psychotherapy
INTRODUCTION
The development of a neuropsychodynamic theory of depression should take into account the
correlation between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, the complexity of subjective experience
in the first-person perspective, and the impossibility to localize this subjective experience in
specific brain regions. The starting point for the neuropsychodynamic theory of depression is a
psychic-orientated term of localization, which considers the biological, psychological and social
dimension of depression, with the differentiation between higher and lower regions of functions
being of only secondary importance. In this neuropsychodynamic concept, the different modes
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of correlation between biological, psychological and social
dimensions are central. Therefore, contrary to a merely
biologically-oriented perspective in which the brain is generally
looked upon as isolated from the psychosocial context, the
psychodynamic perspective looks upon the brain as ‘‘embedded’’
in the psychosocial context (Northoff, 2000, 2004, 2013; Northoff
and Boeker, 2006; Northoff et al., 2004). In this view, first-person
neuroscience should indeed search for non-localistic ways of
finding correlations between subjective experience and neuronal
conditions. Therefore, neuronal integration over different brain
regions, rather than neuronal localization in one or more
regions, will be discussed in the following neuropsychodynamic
framework of depression.
PSYCHODYNAMIC KEY FEATURES OF
DEPRESSION
In view of the development of the variety of psychoanalytic
theories of depression (overview in Brenner, 1991; Mentzos,
1995, 2009; Böker, 1999, 2005; Gabbard, 2005, 2014; see
also Force, 2008; for an operationalized research approach to
Psychodynamic Psychotherapy of depression), we will focus on
the essential dimensions of depression, which are related to
Freud’s outstanding contribution ‘‘Mourning and Melancholia’’
(Freud, 1917). Contrary to mourning, in which the loss of the
significant other is elevated by symbol formation (Segal, 1957),
the depressive syndrome does not have a symbolizing function,
but is the consequence of the inhibition or the somatopsychic-
psychosomatic dead-end of depression (Gut, 1989; Böker, 2002,
2003a). At an early stage, Freud differentiated depression,
paraphrased as ‘‘melancholia,’’ from mourning (Trauerarbeit):
‘‘In mourning it is the world which has become poor and
empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself.’’ (Freud, 1917,
p. 246). This citation underlines the functional perspective
on depressive symptoms: a primary useful reaction to loss
(withdrawal of the mourning person to stabilize one’s self)
develops into becoming dysfunctional in the further course
(lack of emotional resonance, predominance of negative,
dysfunctional cognitions and extreme withdrawal behavior).
Freud stressed the ego-regression from object cathexis to
narcissism and pointed to the loss of reality function connected
with this:
‘‘...; then, owing to a real slight or disappointment coming from
this loved person, the object-relationship was shattered. The result
was not the normal one of a withdrawal of the libido from this
object and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something
different, for whose coming-about various conditions seem to
be necessary. The object-cathexis proved to have little power of
resistance and was brought to an end. But the free libido was not
displaced on to another object; it was withdrawn into the ego.
There, however, it was not employed in any unspecified way, but
served to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned
object. Thus, the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the
latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it
were an object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was
transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and
the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity and
the ego as altered by identification’’
— (Freud, 1917, p. 249).
Freud’s original phenomenological distinction between
mourning and depression is supported by recent neurobiological
studies. For example, Gündel et al. (2003) showed that mourning
is mediated by a distributed brain network related to affect
processing, mentalizing, emotional memory, face processing,
visual imagery and autonomic regulation. Other studies
(O’Connor et al., 2002, 2008; Najib et al., 2004) also found
neurobiological changes in mourning that are distinct from
changes in depression (e.g., activation of nucleus accumbens,
activation of amygdala, variation in the monoamine oxidase A
(MAO-A) promoter gene, variation in heart rate variability).
The important relation between loss of the object and loss of
the self will be focussed on in a neuro-scientific perspective (see
Boeker and Northoff, 2018). Along this line, we will refer to the
following ‘‘psychodynamic essentials of depression’’:
1. Reactivation of earlier experiences of loss in childhood.
2. Introjection of the lost objects in childhood in connection
with negative emotions.
3. Loss of object relations in connection with increased
self-focussed attention.
Studies and theories which are influenced by object-
relations psychoanalysis and infant research are of outstanding
importance for the neuropsychodynamic approach of depression
described in this article. In fact, previous studies consistently
showed that mental representations of care-giving relationships
are key components in understanding the development of
a vulnerability to depression (Stolorov, 1986; Adroer, 1998;
Malancharuvil, 2004; Fonagy et al., 2007). Most importantly,
the early loss of objects in childhood is part of the bio-psycho-
social vulnerability of persons likely to develop a depressive
disorder in later life (Jacobson, 1971; Kernberg, 1976; Bowlby,
1980; Lichtenberg, 1983; Stern, 1983, 1985; Gut, 1989; Blatt,
1998). The fixation on the mental representation of the lost
objects involves great psycho-energetic exertion, which Freud
compared to an ‘‘open wound’’ taking psychic energy from
the self and object representations. This regressive process
leads to both the outer world and the self being completely
depleted of representations. Besides the early loss of objects
in childhood and the increased inner focus, the loss of actual
object relations represents the third psychodynamic key feature
of depression. The mental representation of the lost object
includes a disregarding encountering of other objects in the
actual environment of the adult. Others are exclusively or
predominantly perceived in the perspective of the lost object.
Depressed persons develop an increased inner focus and
are no longer able to focus on the outer world. This self-
focussed attention is the focus of perception of interpersonal
relationships: the self-focused attention in depressed patients
(Ingram, 1990) is often connected with interactional vicious
circles which may cause an increasing helplessness of both
partners. Previous studies on social interaction (Coyne, 1976a,b,
1985; Coyne et al., 1987; Boeker et al., 2000; Boeker, 2004),
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for instance, showed that the environmental response may
play an important role in the maintenance of depressed
behavior; further, that partners are important for the self
identity of the depressive patient in a much stronger way
than for non-depressed controls; and finally, that half of the
depressive patients ‘‘construed’’ the partner as similar to the
self and similar to the ideal self. With regard to the sensory
perception, it can be assumed that the attention shifts from
the exteroceptive sensory system (signalizes environmental
events and the relationship between the subject and her/his
environment) to the interoceptive system, which processes the
stimuli of the body.
A great number of studies with different measures and
methodologies underline the self focused perception in
depression. The results converge in an increased and possibly
altered level of self focused attention in depression (Ingram,
1990). It is unclear up to now, whether this increased self focus
exclusively exists on an explicit, conscious level—according
to our definition—or already on an implicit, unconscious
level.
The self in depression is attributed to negative emotions
(failure, guilt, hypochondriacal fear of illness and death, in some
cases connected with depressive delusion). Positive emotions
are no longer connected with ones own self. These scrupulous
tendencies correlate with the number of former suicide attempts
and are risk factors for suicidal behavior.
The cognitive processing of the own self (rumination)
increases the depressive mood and develops into an increasingly
dysfunctional mechanism of compensation which is connected
with the self-focussed attention and a repetitive focus of ones own
negative emotions (Ingram, 1990; Treynor et al., 2003; Rimes and
Watkins, 2005). It may be hypothesized that the increased inward
focus in depression corresponds with psychodynamic processes,
especially introjections and identification of the self with a lost
object. The connection between introject and self with negative
affects which is postulated in a psychodynamic perspective
corresponds to the phenomenological/psychopathological
description of the association of the self with negative emotions.
Finally, the significance of the actual loss of objects corresponds
with the increased cognitive processing of the self because the
cognitive processing no longer focuses on the actual loss, but on
the loss of objects with which the self is identified (‘‘decreased
environmental focus’’).
NEUROPSYCHODYNAMIC CONCEPT OF
PSYCHODYNAMIC DEFENCE
MECHANISMS IN DEPRESSION
Neuronal integration characterizes the coordination and
modulation of neuronal activity over multiple brain regions.
The interaction between brain regions far apart from each
other is considered necessary for the development of specific
functions such as emotions or cognition (see Price and
Friston, 2002; Friston, 2003). It may be hypothesized that
defence mechanisms are complex emotional-cognitive
interactions that are not localized in specific or isolated
brain regions but depend on the interaction between
different brain regions, i.e., neuronal integration, or
connectivity.
There is a distinction between functional and effective
connectivity (see Friston and Price, 2001, p. 277): functional
connectivity represents the ‘‘correlation between distant
neurophysiological events’’ which may depend either on direct
interaction between these events or on different factors which
modulate different events. In the first case, the correlation results
from the interaction itself; in the second case, the correlation
may result by means of different factors, e.g., stimulus-
related procedures with common input or stimulus-induced
oscillations. In contrast to functional connectivity, effective
connectivity describes the directed interaction between brain
regions. Effective connectivity relates to the directed influence
of one neuronal system to another, either at the synaptic
level or at the level of neuronal interaction in different
regions (macro-level, see Friston and Price, 2001). In the
further course of this article, connectivity at the macro-level is
assumed.
On the basis of connectivity, the neuronal activity between
brain regions far away from each other can be adapted,
coordinated and harmonized. This coordination and adaptation
relies on certain principles of neuronal integration (Northoff,
2004; Northoff and Boeker, 2006). These principles represent
functional mechanisms which play an important role in the
organization and coordination of neuronal activity in different
brain regions.
Four of these principles have been investigated in our
neuroimaging studies on emotional-cognitive interaction:
1. Top-down/bottom-up modulation and somatization.
2. Reciprocal modulation and introjection.
3. Modulation through functional unit and sensori-motor
regression.
4. Self-referential processing, ego-inhibition, and decoupling of
the self.
It may be hypothesized that each of these four principles of
neuronal integrationmay be associated with specific mechanisms
of defence and compensation.
Top-Down/Bottom-Up Modulation and
Somatization
Top-down modulation can be described as modulation of
hierarchically lower-level brain regions by higher-level
regions. Thus, top-down modulation resembles the concept
of ‘‘re-entrant circularity’’ (Tononi and Edelman, 2000) and
feedback-modulation (Lamme, 2001). These concepts focus
on exchange of information and adaptation of neuronal
activity in a certain brain region in accordance with another
remote region. As a result, neuronal activity in a lower region
can be adapted, filtered and attuned in accordance with
neuronal activity in the higher region. Typical examples of
top-down modulation are: modulation of neuronal activity
in subcortical regions by cortical regions; modulation of
subcortical basal ganglia (e.g., nucleus caudatus and striatum)
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by premotor/motoric cortical regions (see Masterman and
Cummings, 1997; Northoff, 2002a,b); and modulation of the
primary visual cortex by prefrontal cortical regions (Lamme,
2004).
Cognition-emotion interactions are crucially regulated
via top-down modulation from the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) to the amygdala (Davidson, 2002; Pessoa et al., 2002;
Pessoa and Ungerleider, 2004) and the insula (Nagai et al.,
2004). The insula has a tense and reciprocal relation to other
subcortical medial regions, for instance the hypothalamus and
the periaqueductal gray (PAG; Panksepp, 1998a,b). Both the
amygdala and the subcortical medial regions play an important
role in the regulation of internal somatic functions, whereas
the medial prefrontal cortical regions are predominantly
associated with emotional processing (Phan et al., 2002;
Murphy et al., 2003; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004). All these
three regions—the MPFC, the amygdala and subcortical
medial regions—have tense and reciprocal connections.
Therefore, circular modulation between all these regions may be
assumed.
Possibly, there is not only a top-down modulation, but
also a bottom-up modulation. A hierarchically lower region
modulates the activity in a hierarchically higher region by means
of the bottom-up modulation. In this way, subcortical midline
regions may, for instance, modulate neuronal activity in the
MPFC via the insula. Accordingly, it may be assumed that
top-down/bottom-up modulation co-exists in the same region
at the same time, which may, from a functional perspective,
lead to reciprocal adaptation between emotional processing
and processing of internal body functions. The simultaneous
occurrence of top-down/bottom-up modulation corresponds to
a psychological default-perspective wherein emotional awareness
predominates over somatic awareness. The experience and
awareness of internally or externally generated emotions comes
to the fore, whereas the awareness of the body remains in the
background. In this way, a predominating external focus may
be explained, in which attention is directed to other persons
and events in the outside world. In contrast, the internal
focus—that is the attention to one’s own body—remains in the
background.
The functional equilibrium between the top-down
and bottom-up modulation may be disturbed in the
course of regressive processes and defence mechanisms
connected with these. Regression may be understood
as a re-actualization of earlier functional levels and the
concomitant dominance of somatic reactions instead of
emotional and cognitive patterns of reaction. Somatization may
be characterized as a specific form of mental processing
and intensive perception of somatic disturbances. The
mechanisms of somatization can be paradigmatically
observed in depressive patients who often experience
somatic symptoms—especially autonomous-vegetative
symptoms—in a subjective way. It may be hypothesized
that somatization in depression is correlated with a disturbed
equilibrium of top-down/bottom-up modulation between
emotional processing and processing of internal body
signals.
At a functional level, somatization may point at the
predominance of internal processing of the body in contrast to
emotional processing. Primary signals of the internal controlling
centers of the body are processed, whereas processing of the
emotional stimuli originating either internally or externally
remains in the background. The balance between internal
processing of the body and emotional processing is adapted to
a new functional level in the following course. Accordingly, it
can be assumed that depressed patients with strong somatization
react much more intensively to internal stimuli from the body
than to internal or external emotional stimuli. Furthermore,
depressed patients show extremely strong autonomous-
vegetative reactions (for instance heart rate variability; Bär
et al., 2004). Finally, depressed patients show reduced reactions
to externally induced emotions, for instance in the context of
social interaction. This was already underlined by results from
earlier studies on communication in depression (see Coyne,
1976a,b, 1985; Coyne et al., 1987). From the psychological
perspective, somatization is reflected by an increased awareness
of one’s own body and the internal functions of the body.
Depressed patients shift their attention away from their own
or other’s emotions to their own body functions. Depressed
patients do not observe their own emotions, but rather their
own body functions. They do not observe others’ emotions,
but rather their own body. At the neuropsychological level,
this increased internal focus is reflected in changes in attention
and theory of mind, which was shown empirically both in
theory of mind tasks (Inoue et al., 2004) and in findings of
attention deficits (Paradiso et al., 1997; Murphy et al., 1999,
2001; Sheppard and Teasdale, 2004). Recent neuroimaging
studies (Paulus and Stein, 2010; for review Wiebking et al.,
2010) support the notion that depressed patient show increased
somatization related to altered brain functioning. Wiebking
et al. (2010), for example, investigated the neural correlates
of interoception in healthy and depressed subjects using the
Body Perception Questionnaire (BPQ) and a well-established
heartbeat perception task in fMRI. They found that depressed
patients showed significantly higher scores in the BPQ and
left anterior insula signal changes correlated with depression
severity.
Furthermore, Ernst et al. (2013, 2014) investigated the neural
correlates of interoception and its relationship to empathy.
They found that preceding interoceptive awareness period
significantly enhanced neural activity during empathy in bilateral
anterior insula and various cortical midline regions. This suggests
a close relationship between interoception and empathy; thereby,
interoception seems to be implicated to yielding empathy.
Reciprocal Modulation and Introjection
Neuroimaging studies showed a pattern of opposite signal
changes in the medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC)
during emotional-cognitive interaction (Goel and Dolan,
2003a,b; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al.,
2004). These results correspond to the assumption of
functional mechanisms of reciprocal modulation and reciprocal
reduction during emotional-cognitive interaction. Reciprocal
modulation is defined as signal changes in opposite directions
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(i.e., increases and decreases of signals). It is already known
that emotional processing (when an emotional picture is
perceived) leads to an increase of signals in the MPFC
regions as well as to a decrease of signals in the LPFC
(Phan et al., 2002; Murphy et al., 2003; Northoff et al.,
2004).
In contrast, cognitive tasks (e.g., judgment or assessment)
produce an opposite pattern of signal increases in the LPFC
and signal decreases in the MPFC. This corresponds to the
functional mechanism of reciprocal modulation (Northoff et al.,
2004; Boeker and Northoff, 2018): the experience of the outside
world is changed to an experience of the inner self (internal
focus). Analogous patterns of reciprocal modulation were also
observed in other cortical regions, for instance in the medial
and lateral orbitofrontal cortex, in the right and left motor
cortex, in the striatal and extra-striatal visual cortex, in the
subgenual anterior cingulum and in the right prefrontal cortex,
in the sub/pre- and supergenual anterior cingulum as well as
in the visual and auditory cortex (overview in Northoff et al.,
2004).
On the basis of the mentioned empirical results, it may
be assumed that emotional-cognitive interaction is associated
with the functional mechanism of reciprocal reduction: if a
cognitive task comprises an emotional component (e.g., when
assessing an emotional picture), fewer signal decreases result in
the MPFC regions and simultaneously fewer signal increases in
the LPFC regions. This process was characterized as attenuation
(synonym: decrease; see Northoff et al., 2004). A reciprocal
attenuation can be referred to because this process occurs
in the medial as well as in the lateral prefrontal cortical
regions in opposite directions (i.e., fewer signal decreases and
increases).
It may be assumed that the reciprocal modulation and
attenuation can be altered in introjective mechanisms at a
neuropsychodynamic level. Introjection is—in an operational
definition—characterized by the shift of object focus from the
outside to the inside in subjective experience. The subject-object
relationship is no longer directed to the outside, but to the inside.
The experience of the outside is changed into an experience of
the inner self.
The defence mechanism of introjection can be
paradigmatically observed in depressed patients. These patients
tend to internalize their conflicts with others and shift the
aggression which was primarily directed towards others, against
their own self. It may be hypothesized that this introjection
in depression may be associated with the abnormal reciprocal
modulation during emotional-cognitive interaction (Deci et al.,
1994; Adroer, 1998; Malancharuvil, 2004).
From a functional and psychological perspective, introjective
processes in depressed patients may be related to disturbances
of emotional-cognitive re-adaptation. Depressed patients are
no longer able to adequately assess their own emotional and
body experience. The assessment of one’s own conditions is
‘‘subjectively’’ distorted and decoupled from ‘‘objective’’ reality.
This subjective distortion is seen in a marked negativity of the
assessment of one’s own emotions and the body, and also of
the assessment of others’ emotions and the events in the outside
world. This extreme negativity corresponds to the ‘‘negative or
attentional bias’’ (Elliott et al., 1998, 2000, 2002; Gotlib et al.,
2004). The results of a study on the perception of faces (Gotlib
et al., 2004), for instance, pointed out that the ‘‘negative or
attentional bias’’ may be connected to interpersonal dysfunction
in depressed patients. Further studies are necessary to explain
how and why the ‘‘negative or attentional bias’’ apparently
induces a decoupling of the ‘‘subjective’’ assessment from the
‘‘objective’’ reality.
On the basis of the generated empirical results, it may
be assumed that the disturbed reciprocal modulation and
attenuation during emotional-cognitive interaction in depression
is of outstanding importance for the development of introjective
defence and compensation mechanisms. This notion has been
supported by several neuroimaging studies (Mayberg et al.,
1999; Brody et al., 2001; Drevets, 2001) which showed that
depressive patients show both increased neural activity in
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and decreased
neural activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
as compared to healthy subjects. Thus, maladjustment of
reciprocal modulation and attenuation might account for
both emotional and cognitive deficits in depressive patients.
Furthermore, Zimmermann et al. (2015), in their seminal
psychotherapy study, applied multilevel mediation analyses; the
results showed that post-treatment differences in interpersonal
problems and introject affiliation were mediated by the higher
number of sessions; and follow-up differences in depressive
symptoms were mediated by the more pronounced application
of psychoanalytic techniques. Furthermore, they also found
some evidence for indirect treatment effects via psychoanalytic
techniques on changes in introject affiliation during follow-
up. They concluded that these effects provide support for
the prediction that both a high dose and the application
of psychoanalytic techniques facilitate therapeutic change in
patients with major depression.
Modulation Through Functional Unit and
Sensori-Motor Regression
A further example of functional mechanisms of emotional-
cognitive interaction is the development of functional units in
different brain regions over time. Such transient functional units
could be identified on the basis of psychophysiological features
or functional connectivity in the involved regions (Friston, 1998,
2003; Friston et al., 1998a,b, 2003; Friston and Price, 2003).
The cortical midline structures (CMS, Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004), for instance, show a continuously high level of neuronal
activity also under resting state conditions (e.g., when passively
regarding a fixation cross; Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Gusnard
et al., 2001; Mazoyer et al., 2001; Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al.,
2001). Furthermore, the regions within the cortical midline
structures are characterized by dense anatomical connections.
In addition, investigations on the functional activity in the
CMS found an increase in functional activity in the CMS
between anterior and posterior CMS regions in the resting
state, whereas this connectivity decreased during active cognitive
tasks.
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The participation of both anterior and posterior midline
structures is in line with results from further studies on cognitive,
emotional and social processing (overview in Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004). Furthermore, signal decreases were found
both in the orbito-medial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC) and the
parietal cortex (PC) during cognitive tasks requiring attention. In
addition, these regions show an increased circular connectivity
(Greicius et al., 2003, 2007; Raichle, 2003). In summary, these
empirical results deliver convincing evidence for the existence of
the CMS and a functional unit, which is particularly active and
cohesive in the resting state (Greicius et al., 2003; Wicker et al.,
2003a,b,c).
With this in mind, it may be assumed that modulation
through functional unit is altered in regressive processes
involving sensori- and motor functions. Sensori-motor
regression can be defined as a defence and compensation
mechanism, which is activated when conflicts and anxieties
can no longer be solved by means of cognitive and emotional
functions and when somatic and particularly sensori-motor
functions are involved. The defence mechanism or the sensori-
motor regression can be paradigmatically observed in patients
with catatonia (‘‘scared stiff’’; Böker, 2000a,b, 2001; Böker
et al., 2000a,b). It may be hypothesized that the sensori-motor
regression in catatonia is connected with altered modulation
by functional unit in the CMS (overview in Böker et al.,
2000a,b; Northoff et al., 2003, 2004). This hypothesis has been
investigated in an fMRI study in catatonic patients with an
underlying affective or schizoaffective psychosis (Northoff
et al., 2002). They found significantly altered activation
patterns in orbitofrontal and premotor cortex during negative
emotional stimulation which correlated significantly with
affective, behavioral, and motor alterations in catatonia. It was
concluded that orbitofrontal cortical dysfunction and related
alterations in medial prefrontal and premotor cortical activity
may account for lack of emotional control with consecutive
sensori-motor regression as an ‘‘immobilization by anxieties’’
in catatonia (both in depression and schizophrenia), where
regression to somatic defense mechanisms is paradigmatically
observed.
Self-Referential Processing, Ego-Inhibition
and Decoupling of the Self
Certain sensory stimuli are related to one’s own person,
contrary to other stimuli which are rather related to other
persons and the outside world. Accordingly, self-referential
stimuli can be differentiated from non-self-referential stimuli
(Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff and Boeker, 2006). This
differentiation is valid not only for sensory stimuli, but also for
emotional and cognitive stimuli. From a functional perspective,
self-referential processing points at a simple distinguishing
process, the distinction between self and non-self. This process
is decisive for the distinction between one’s own stimuli
and those from others, and therefore for the distinction
between self and the outside world. Moreover, self-referential
processing may be a pre-requisite condition for the development
of a concept of one’s own self, the so-called mental or
phenomenal self as a subject of experience (Northoff et al.,
1997, 2000, 2005; Panksepp, 1998a,b; Damasio, 1999; Northoff,
2004).
From a psychological perspective, self-referential processing
may be manifest in the possibility of a subjective experience
of one’s own self or ego (both terms are used synonymously
in the following; see Freud, 1914; Kohut, 1977; Dennecker,
1989). By marking certain stimuli as self-referential, they
can be experienced subjectively, i.e., from the individual
subject’s or ego perspective (Northoff and Boeker, 2006).
Owing to the fact that, besides the internal and sensory
stimuli of one’s own body, emotions and cognitions
are also examined with regard to their self-reference,
emotions and cognitions can be attributed to one’s own
self. The subject constituted primarily by one’s own body
is ‘‘filled’’, so to speak, with certain related emotions and
cognitions.
The development of neuropsychodynamic hypotheses of
altered self-reference in depression is based on the investigation
of the emotional-cognitive interaction in depressed patients,
which focussed on the neurophysiological correlates of
depressive inhibition and the neurophysiological substrates
of negative cognitive schemes and the neuropsychological
deficits (overview in Northoff, 2002a,b; Northoff et al., 2005,
2007; Böker and Northoff, 2005, 2010; Grimm et al., 2006, 2008,
2009; Walter et al., 2009; Boeker et al., 2012). In addition to the
emotional-cognitive interaction, semantic representations (and
their neural correlates) play an important role in depression.
Beyond the concept of cognitive control, psychodynamic
(and neuropsychodynamic) models of depression focus on
the development of the individuals’ capacity to regulate
their emotional states in significant interactive relationships
during childhood and through the re-construction of the
representation of the self, of significant others, and relationships
(see Messina et al., 2015, 2016a,b). Furthermore, consistent
with psychodynamic (and neuropsychodynamic) models of
depression, psychological functions associated with the default
mode system include self-related processing, semantic processes,
and implicit forms of emotion regulation (Messina et al.,
2016a).
Rumination is a form of self-referential processing, which is
the process of relating information to the self. In a meta-analysis
of neuroimaging studies focused on self-referential processing,
Northoff et al. (2006) found that commonly activated regions
lie in dorsal and ventral areas of the medial prefrontal and
anterior cingulate cortices, as well as the posterior cingulate
cortex and precuneus. These regions have been termed cortical
midline structures (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004) and somewhat
overlap with the intrinsic default mode network (DMN;
Raichle et al., 2001). A recent review (Nejad et al., 2013) of
neuroimaging studies on rumination, self-related processing, and
depression found that the anterior cortical midline structures
play an important role in maladaptive rumination in major
depression.
To sum up, depression may be characterized by reduced
neuronal activity in the left DLPFC and increased activity
in the right DLPFC. The neuronal activity in the left
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DLPFC cannot be modified by emotional valence. The
severity of depression correlates with the activity in the
right DLPFC. Connected with the reduced deactivation in
the pregenual ACC (DMN), depressed persons cannot shift
their attention from themselves to the outside world (Grimm
et al., 2008). The degree of helplessness and the severity of
depressive symptoms correlate with the reduced deactivation
in the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC) and
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). The signal intensities in
different subcortical and cortical midline regions (DMPFC,
supragenual anterior cingulate cortex (SACC), precuneus,
ventral striatum (VS), DMT) were reduced significantly. On the
basis of these empirical results, it may be concluded that the
increased negative self-attributions—as typical characteristics of
an increased self-focus in depression—may result from altered
neuronal activity in subcortical-cortical midline structures in the
brain1 (especially from hyperactivity in the cortical-subcortical
midline regions and hypoactivity in the lateral regions).
On the basis of neuropsychological, neurophysiological and
neurochemical findings and, as we mentioned, psychodynamic
dimensions of depression, neuropsychodynamic hypotheses on
the disturbed self-reference in depression were developed and
related to psychodynamic and specific neuronal mechanisms of
depression.
Finally, the decoupling of the self characterizes the extreme
form of the altered self-related processes in depression, including
complete loss of self. A typical example of decoupled self
experience may be encountered in severely depressed patients
with psychotic symptoms, e.g., nihilistic delusion (Cotard
Syndrome).
DYSBALANCE OF RESTING STATE
ACTIVITY IN DMN AND MENTAL
REACTIVATION OF EARLY OBJECT LOSS
In the neuropsychodynamic framework presented here, it
may be hypothesized that altered resting state activity2 in
depression is a pre-disposition for reactivation of early object
loss experiences in the subject. There is ample evidence
for resting state abnormalities in depression. For example,
PET-studies in major depression found decreased resting state
activity, especially in the lateral anterior cortical midline regions
(PACC, VMPFC, compare Mayberg et al., 1999; Mayberg,
2002, 2003a,b; Phillips et al., 2003). Alterations in neural
activity were shown in ventral regions of the so-called DMN
in depressed patients (reduced deactivation, that is negative
BOLD-reactions, see Greicius et al., 2007; Grimm et al., 2009;
Sheline et al., 2009). Furthermore, a translational meta-analysis
1We do not understand the cortical midline areas as an unitary neural system
but as an important component of neural integration which characterizes
the coordination and modulation of neuronal activity over multiple brain
regions.We desribed functional and effective connectivity and four principles
of neural integration in the third section of the article (see Fox et al., 2005).
2Resting state activity in the brain represents the intrinsic activity of the brain
and should be differentiated from the brain’s activity induced by somatic
stimuli or outside stimuli.
of resting state studies in depressed patients and in animal
models confirm resting state hyperactivity in ventral, cortical
midline regions (PACC, VMPFC; Drevets and Raichle, 1998;
Drevets, 2000, 2001; Fitzgerald et al., 2007; Drevets et al., 2008;
Alcaro et al., 2010; Price and Drevets, 2010). In contrast to
the anterior midline regions, posterior midline regions (PCC,
precuneus/cuneus) and the superior temporal gyrus (STG)
show hypoactivity in the resting state (Heinzel et al., 2009;
Alcaro et al., 2010). The hyperactivity in the anterior midline
regions and the hypoactivity in the posterior midline regions
result from a disturbed balance between anterior and posterior
midline regions in acute depression and a disturbance in
the DMN in depression (Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner et al.,
2008).
How can these results be related to psychodynamic
mechanisms, especially the reactivation of early loss in
childhood? Early traumatization causes alterations in developing
processes which may contribute to the development of early
immature defencemechanisms (Feinberg, 2011). Traumatization
in early childhood was found in a large subgroup of depressed
patients (experiences of loss, divorce of parents, physical or
sexual abuse; see Böker, 2000a,b; Nemeroff et al., 2003; Gabbard,
2005, 2014). Traumatic life-events may cause biological
alterations on the genetic, hormonal or anatomic-structural
level (Feder et al., 2009). It may be hypothesized that traumatic
life experiences interfere with the development of the VMPC
and especially the ventral anterior subcortical-cortical midline
regions as an essential part of the DMN. Anterior midline
regions are especially involved in the processing of the
degree of self-reference of different stimuli, whereas the
posterior regions are likely to be involved in the processing
of social and non-self-related stimuli (Qin and Northoff,
2011).
Furthermore, it may be assumed that early traumatic
experience of object loss is associated with the desperate attempt
to relate the self to the lost object in order to develop a
self-object relationship and to experience the lost object as a
self-object. In connection with this, possible hyperactivation,
especially in the anterior midline regions, may be induced,
which finally contributes to a disbalance in the posterior midline
regions.
The retrieval of early traumatic experiences in the context
of current experiences of object loss triggers a reactivation of
the same neuronal patterns used in the early development of a
relationship to the object with a consecutive hyperactivity in the
anterior midline regions and a disbalance in the posterior regions
and in the DMN.
In view of the early object loss, depressed patients develop
a psychological pre-disposition to attribute a high degree of
self-reference to lost or disappointing objects. Therefore, a
neuronal pre-disposition for the development of hyperactivity
in the resting state in anterior midline regions, when object loss
is experienced in adulthood, is induced. Accordingly, it can be
hypothesized that the psychological and neuronal predisposition
correspond with the psychodynamic predisposition, the
reactivation of early object loss. When actual stimuli induce
less stimulus-induced activity in the anterior midline regions
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FIGURE 1 | Resting state activity: dysbalance and mental reactivation of lost objects.
because of the abnormally increased resting state activity, the
brain keeps predominantly occupied with itself, i.e., that the
earlier experienced contents and the objects are reactivated
by the increased resting state activity accordingly or that
the representations of the earlier objects are represented in
the actual context (see Figure 1; see Boeker and Northoff,
2018).
Reduced Resting
State-Stimulus-Interaction and Introjection
in Correlation With Negative Emotions
Resting state-stimulus-interaction includes the interaction
between two different modes of neural activity: the intrinsic
activity of the brain and the stimulus-induced activity (induced
by stimuli from the outside world and/or the own body). It
may be hypothesized that resting state-stimulus-interaction
in depression is reduced because of increased resting state
activity and that the resting state-stimulus-interaction is
associated with introjective processes in the interaction
between self and the object world connected with negative
emotions. Functional activation paradigms (emotional,
cognitive) showed dysfunctional activation patterns, especially
hyperactivity, in the ventral cortical midline regions in patients
with major depression during resting state and emotional
stimulation (Elliott et al., 1998, 2002; Mayberg et al., 1999;
Davidson, 2002; Mayberg, 2002, 2003a,b; Davidson et al., 2003;
Canli et al., 2004; Fu et al., 2004). In other brain regions,
especially in the reward system (VS/n.accumbens, right and
left amygdala), dysfunctional activation patterns were found
during positive and/or negative emotional stimulation in
major depressive disorder (MDD; Kumari et al., 2003; Canli
et al., 2004; Lawrence et al., 2004; Surguladze et al., 2004).
These dysfunctional activation patterns may be interpreted
as the neurophysiological basis of the ‘‘negative affective
bias,’’ that is the focussing of negative emotions which is
related to the inability to process positive emotions (Mayberg,
2003a,b; Phillips et al., 2003; Grimm et al., 2009; Heinzel
et al., 2009; Heller et al., 2009). The reduced deactivation in
cortical-subcortical regions was correlated with the severity
of depression and the degree of hopelessness. A direct
association between reduced resting state-stimulus-interaction
and the severity of depression may be assumed (Grimm et al.,
2009).
Further studies focussed on the biochemical basis of the
reduced resting state stimulus interaction. It could be shown
that increased resting state activity in the PACC is associated
with the concentration of the neurotransmitter glutamate (Zarate
et al., 2006; Maeng and Zarate, 2007; Northoff et al., 2007;
Maeng et al., 2008; Walter et al., 2009; Alcaro et al., 2010;
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FIGURE 2 | Reduced stimulus-rest-interaction, reduced outside focus and increased self-focus.
Sanacora, 2010). A disbalance between neuronal inhibition and
excitation in the anterior midline regions in depressed patients
may be assumed.
The induced resting state activity in the brain inhibits
the neuronal processing of stimuli from the outside world.
Stimuli from the outside world cannot be related to one’s own
self or connected with emotional valence. Nevertheless, these
psychological mechanisms are still active and are mediated
by the induced resting state activity. From a psycho-energetic
perspective, the energy which is usually used for the development
of self-relatedness and the connection with emotions (emotional
valence) is related to early stimuli which are related to early object
loss and the induced resting state activity.
The change from current to early stimuli may contribute to
an increase of introjective processes in a neuropsychodynamic
perspective. The reactivated stimuli from the past are related
to the self and negative emotional valence. Stimuli which are
connected with early object loss are introjected and related
with negative emotions. It may be assumed that this process
corresponds with an introjective type of depression (Blatt, 1998)
which is characterized by an increased interpersonal relatedness.
Reduced Stimulus-Resting
State-Interaction and the Loss of Current
Object Relations
It may be hypothesized that the modulation of the resting
state activity by means of stimulus-induced activity and
the stimulus resting state interaction in depression is
reduced because of the increased resting state activity.
Reduced stimulus resting state interaction probably leads to
dysfunctional development of the neuronal structure and
organization which is associated with dysfunctional processing
of current experiences of loss. The reduced stimulus resting
state interaction can be seen in three different patterns:
(1) interoceptive stimuli no longer modify the resting state
or baseline activity of the brain (Wiebking et al., 2010);
(2) exteroceptive stimuli are no longer associated with value
and reward (Kumar et al., 2008; Dichter et al., 2009; Pizzagalli
et al., 2009; Smoski et al., 2009; Sajonz et al., 2010); and
(3) exteroceptive stimuli no longer induce or constitute cognitive
processing (Goel and Dolan, 2003a,b; Northoff et al., 2004;
Grimm et al., 2006; see Figure 2, see Boeker and Northoff,
2018).
On the basis of these empirical results, Phillips et al.
(2003) and Mayberg (2002, 2003a) developed a model of the
altered reciprocal functional interaction between ventromedial
and DLPFC in MDD (model of ventro-dorsal dissociation)
where reciprocal modulation of neural activity in depression
is reduced because of reduced deactivation in the medial
regions and reduced activation of the DLPFC (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2008; Grimm et al., 2008). The disturbed
modulation of the lateral prefrontal cortical resting state most
probably contributes to a reduced stimulus-induced activity
triggered by cognitive stimuli. From a neuropsychodynamic
perspective, the reduced stimulus resting state activity and
the reduced exteroceptive neuronal interaction contributes to
a reduced constitution of objects which also results from
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the reduced emotional valence and reward. Current object
relationship experiences lose their emotional significance.
Reduced reciprocal modulation—as the third part of the reduced
stimulus resting state interaction—contributes to a reduced
activation of cognitive processes by exteroceptive stimuli. In
this way, the ‘‘object cathexis’’ is reduced (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2008). Furthermore, it may be assumed that the
disturbed reciprocal modulation may be an adaptive mechanism
by which the depressive self is finally disconnected from
the significance of current object relationship experiences.
From a psycho-energetic perspective, the result is a further
reduction of object cathexis. The depressed patient attempts
to constitute and cathect compensational objects from his
inner world. The inner world encompasses interoceptive
stimuli of the body and cognitive stimuli instead of external
objects.
Reduced Interaction of Exteroceptive
Stimuli
Wiebking et al. (2010) studied the neuronal activity during
exteroceptive and interoceptive perception (heartbeat and
counting of the cardiac frequency) in relation to the resting
state activity of the brain. Exteroceptive stimuli (heartbeat)
contributed to a neuronal activation in the bilateral anterior
insula in depressed patients, if it was related to the previous
resting state activity of the brain. But if the exteroceptive-
induced activity was viewed independently from the previous
resting state activity, significant differences were found between
healthy persons and depressed patients. The resting state
activity in depressed was increased compared to healthy
persons, as the reduced deactivation during stimulus-induced
activity had shown already. Thus, the increased resting state
activity in the bilateral anterior insula contributed to a
reduced interaction of the exteroceptive stimulus with the
previously increased resting state activity. Analogous results were
not found during the interoceptive stimuli (counting of the
heartbeat), by means of which the specificity of the reduced
stimulus-resting state-interaction during exteroceptive stimuli
was underlined.
The importance of the increased resting state activity in
the bilateral anterior insula was further supported through
its correlation with the severity of depression: the higher
the resting state activity in these regions, the more severe
the depression was experienced in the self-assessment
beck depression inventory (BDI). Furthermore, depressed
patients showed increased scores for body perception and
stress (BPQ). This result is consistent with the increased
perception and attention to one’s own body and the unspecific
somatic symptoms, which are characteristic of depression.
Whereas the BPQ-scores in healthy persons correlated with
the resting state activity in the insula significantly, this
correlation was not found in depressed patients: therefore,
it could be concluded that the increased resting state
activity in depressed was decoupled from the perception
and experience of one’s own body. The increased resting
state activity and the consecutively reduced stimulus-rest-
interaction are psychologically and psychopathologically of great
importance.
The second component of the reduced stimulus-rest-
interaction relates to the processing of value and reward. The
reward network includes central regions the ventral tegmental
area (VTA), the VS, and the VMPFC. Actual studies underline
a reduced activity during the processing of reward tasks through
exteroceptive stimuli just in these regions of depressed patients
(Kumar et al., 2008; Dichter et al., 2009; Pizzagalli et al., 2009;
Smoski et al., 2009).
Reduced Stimulus-Rest-Interaction and
Cognitive Processing
The third component of the reduced stimulus-rest-interaction
relates to the reciprocal pattern of neuronal activity between the
medial and LPFCwhich could be shown in different studies (Goel
and Dolan, 2003b; Northoff et al., 2004; Grimm et al., 2006)
and which were described as reciprocal modulation (Northoff
et al., 2004). In healthy persons, exteroceptive stimuli lead to
a deactivation, i.e., to negative BOLD-answers, in the anterior
medial cortical regions, whereas they lead to an increased
neuronal activity in the lateral prefrontal cortical regions
(e.g., in the DLPFC) during cognitive and emotional stimulation.
Contrary, in depressed patients—as already mentioned—not
only a hyperactivity in the ventral cortical midline regions
was found, but also a hypoactivity in the left DLPFC as
well during emotional as during cognitive processing either
(Davidson et al., 2003; Lawrence et al., 2004; Keedwell et al.,
2005). On the basis of these results, Phillips et al. (2003)
and Mayberg (2003b) proposed a model of altered reciprocal
functional connections between ventromedial and DLPFC in
major depression (model of the ventro-dorsal dissociation
in major depression). The reciprocal modulation is reduced
in depression because of the decreased deactivation in the
medial regions and the decreased activation of the DLPFC
(Grimm et al., 2008; Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010), i.e., there
is an opposite activity in the medial and LPFC. When the
medial regions are strongly deactivated, a strong activation in
the lateral regions results, when the lateral regions are less
activated, a less deactivation results in the medial regions.
Therefore, exteroceptive stimuli do not lead to a decreased
deactivation in the medial cortical regions, but also to a
decreased activation in the lateral regions (DLPFC), which are
especially associated with cognitive processing (Grimm et al.,
2006, 2008, 2009). The disturbed modulation of the lateral
prefrontal cortical rest activity probably leads to a decreased
stimulus-induced activity, which is triggered by cognitive
stimuli.
Of what significance are these three different components
of the reduced stimulus-rest-interaction in a psychodynamic
context? In depression, exteroceptive stimuli do not induce
the existing resting state activity of the brain any longer.
The reduced stimulus-resting state activity contributes to a
reduced exteroceptive-neuronal interaction. It may be assumed
accordingly, that the exteroceptive stimuli and the objects with
are related to them are introjected with less probability. The
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consecutive reduced constituting of the objects also results from
the second component of the reduced stimulus-rest-interaction,
the reduced processing of value and reward. The neuronal
activity of the reward system—as the basis of processing of value
induced by stimuli—is extremely reduced in depression. In a
psychodynamic context it can be assumed that the selection of
objects and the possibility to identify with them ismore andmore
reduced because of the reduced ability of processing of value
of stimuli. Actual object relation experiences get increasingly
unimportant.
The reduced reciprocal modulation—as third component
of the reduced stimulus-rest-interaction—implies that
exteroceptive stimuli no longer induce the activation of cognitive
processes (e.g., goal-oriented cognitions). This interferes with
the ‘‘object cathexis,’’ which Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010)
associate in a neuropsychological perspective with goal-oriented
cognition and activity within the DLPFC. The important thing
here is that the reciprocal modulation itself is not disturbed
in depression, but rather the causes of the reduced medial
deactivation have to be explored. These may consist in the
reduced rest activity and the reduction of exteroceptive stimuli,
in which the latter is connected with the reduction of the
previous exteroceptive-neuronal processing of values. Neuronal
activity is not induced in the medial cortical regions by the
incoming exteroceptive stimuli. In this perspective, the apparent
abnormal reciprocal modulation in depression represents a
process of compensation aiming at adapting the brain with
regard to the processing of exteroceptive stimuli. Accordingly,
the neurophysiologic problem in depression is not a lesion or a
deficit of the reciprocal modulation, but the maintenance and
the adaptive function of this mechanism. The depressive self is
uncoupled from the experienced significance of actual object
relation experiences finally. In a psych energetic perspective, a
reduction of the object cathexis results.
Which are the mechanisms of compensation which are
developed by the depressed patient in this situation? To answer
this question Freud’s metaphor of an open wound may be
picked up: The depressed tries to constitute compensatory
objects and to cathect them. In view of the inability to
constitute objects of exteroceptive origin, i.e., from the outside,
and to introject them, the depressed patient constitutes and
introjects objects from the inside. The internal environment
includes interoceptive stimuli from the body and cognitive
stimuli. Instead of exteroceptive-interoceptive and exteroceptive-
cognitive connections, neuronal-interoceptive and interoceptive-
cognitive connections are developed from now on. By this,
the depressed attempts to compensate the loss of exteroceptive
stimuli. In a psychodynamic perspective external objects,
i.e., objects of exteroceptive origin from the outside, are replaced
by internal objects, i.e., objects of interoceptive and cognitive
origin. The outstanding aim is to constitute objects and to
develop object relations. Therefore, in a self-psychological
perspective, this can be understood as a compensation of the
loss of external or sensory self objects by internal or somatic and
cognitive self objects.
Regarding psychopathological symptoms, the constitution of
internal or somatic and cognitive self objects contributes to the
development of somatic symptoms. The body is perceived in
an altered way (see Wiebking et al., 2010). If the constitution
of cognitive self objects dominates, the depressed suffers from
distinctly distorted, negative cognitive schemes and ruminations,
which are experienced as painful and tormenting. Because of the
loss of exteroceptive objects the focus of attention is directed
to one’s own self and the self objects of cognitive origin. In
a phenomenological perspective this was described by us as
increased cognitive processing of one’s own self with ruminations
and a disbalance between the experiential and the analytical self-
focus.
NEUROPSYCHODYNAMIC APPROACH TO
TREATMENT OF DEPRESSION
How can we use the neuropsychodyamic model of depression for
psychotherapeutic interventions in the treatment of depressed
patients? Due to the multidimensionality and heterogeneity
of depressive disorders, it is of essential importance to
adapt the applicable somatotherapeutic and psychotherapeutic
interventions to the specific conditions of each single case.
The concept of depression as psychosomatosis of emotion
regulation and the neuropsychodynamic model of depression
may promote this individualized procedure (see Böker, 2017).
The main aim of the psychotherapy of depression is to
overcome the defensive strategies of the depressed patients
and their intrapsychic, interpersonal, and psychosomatic vicious
circles (Mentzos, 1995; Böker, 2002, 2006, 2009, 2017).
Further therapeutic consequences of the neuropsychodynamic
approach to depression involve the necessary emotional
attunement in psychoanalytic psychotherapy of depressed
patients and the adequate timing of therapeutic interventions
(see Stern, 1983, 1985; Böker, 2003a,b; Boeker et al., 2013; see
Table 1).
A stepwise adapted therapeutic focus, which takes state-
variables of depression as well as trait-variables into account,
is necessary. Particularly with regard to the actual emotional
and cognitive state (see Böker and Grimm, 2012) and to
the recidivism and chronification in the long-time course
either, the importance of the hyperarousal of depressed
patients, as subjective and clinical expression of the
hyperactivity of the cortical midline structures, which was
pointed out in this contribution, has to be kept in mind.
Agitation and anxiety of the depressed patient require an
appropriate containment, especially in the beginning of
the treatment. In the long-time treatment course structural
aspects of the personality of the patients move more and
more into the center (e.g., dependency in relationships),
furthermore the effects of experienced traumatization in
another subgroup. The synergistic effects of pharmaco- and
psychotherapy (as an expression of top-down- and bottom-
up-mechanisms) are often the starting point for a combination
therapy.
Psychoanalytic psychotherapy focusses primarily on the
conflictuous forms of self-worth regulation and relationship
expectations, especially in the long-time course. Generally, due
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TABLE 1 | Neuropsychodynamic approach, psychotherapeutic attitude and therapeutic focus.
Depression
- Dysfunction of cortical midline structures (CMS)
- Arousal (Hyperactivity CMS)
- Disturbed self-referential processing
- Intensified processing of the body
Therapy:
- Acute and severe depression: state variables
- Longer course: trait variables
Neuropsychodynamic psychotherapy:
- Phase typical, stepwise adapted focus
- Beginning:
- Containment
- Being aware of anxiety, agitation and cognitive dysfunction
- Course:
- Increasing focus on conflictuous self-worth regulation and relationship expectations
- Long-time course (recidivism, double depression, loss of psychosocial functions, chronicity): psychotherapeutic maintenance strategies
to network dynamics and gene-expression, a sufficiently long
duration of the treatment is necessary, and ‘‘psychotherapeutic
maintenance strategies’’ are often necessary (Schauenburg and
Clarkin, 2003).
The adequate timing of therapeutic interventions (in the
sense of ‘‘now moments’’, see Stern, 1983) is especially
important in the treatment of depressed patients. In this
context, a specific problem of treatment technique derives from
the encounter with different levels of symbolization and a
possibly discontinuous process of de- and re-symbolization,
which may be connected with a temporal decoupling of the
psychic process and a reoccurrence of manifest depressive
symptoms (see Böker, 2003a,b; Böker and Grimm, 2012; Böker,
2017). This discontinuity may also contribute to difficult
countertransference feelings (e.g., guilt, shame, aggression,
doubtfulness, self-criticism), similar to those feelings the
depressed patient is suffering from. Furthermore, this may
hinder the psychotherapist in his/her necessarily supportive
and confident attitude. The insight into the neuronal and
neuropsychodynamic mechanisms of depression (e.g., resting
state hyperactivity, reduced rest-stimulus interaction) may
help the psychotherapist to get along with this specific
challenge in the therapeutic relationship and to use the
countertransference feelings for therapeutic interventions in the
further course.
Emotional experience evolves during the course of a
psychoanalytic psychotherapy of depressed patients in the sense
of a re-symbolization from the participation in a sensomotor
affect through a trans modal change to an experienced emotion
(‘‘semiotic progression,’’ see Böhme-Bloem, 1999) by discovering
the otherness of the other and being able tomourn the separation:
‘‘The capacity to experience loss and the wish to recreate
the object within oneself gives the individual the unconscious
freedom in the use of symbols’’ (Segal, 1957, p. 394). Segal
concluded: ‘‘The process of symbol formation is, ..., a continuous
process of bringing together and integrating the internal with the
external, the subject with the object, and the earlier experiences
with the later ones’’ (p. 397).
The hypotheses which have been developed in the context
of the neuropsychodynamic model of depression may be used
for more specific psychotherapeutic interventions, aiming at
specific mechanisms of compensation and defence, which are
related to the increased resting state activity and the disturbed
resting state-stimulus-interaction. Moreover, in a future ‘‘brain-
based psychodynamic psychotherapy’’ of depression, the enabled
processes of development and separation will be based on new
experiences in the context of the therapeutic relationship.
Finally, the neurobiological effects of psychotherapy, though
one of the most interesting and important challenges of a
multidimensional psychotherapy research (for a methodological
discussion, see Boeker et al., 2013), was not in the focus
of the article. Because of the importance of this issue, we
shortly mention recent neurobiological literature concerning
neural effects of psychotherapy. A recent meta-analysis on
neuroimaging findings of neural change in brain networks
associated to emotion regulation after psychotherapy of
depression by Messina et al. (2013) detected consistent changes
in the DMPFC and in the posterior cingulated gyrus/precuneus,
and in several areas in the temporal lobes in depression. A
further meta-analysis by Kalsi et al. (2017) compared the
effects of psychotherapy compared to antidepressant therapy
on brain activity in depression. They found that patients
undergoing psychotherapy showed an increase in the right
paracingulate activity while pharmacological treatment led to a
decrease of activation of this area. They interpreted this finding
as supporting the hypothesis that psychotherapy increases
top-down emotional regulation through self-knowledge and
meaning processing. In a recent neuroimaging study in depressed
patients undergoing psychodynamic psychotherapy, Buchheim
et al. (2012) recently showed that psychodynamic psychotherapy
in depressed patients reduces activation in the left anterior
hippocampus/amygdala, subgenual cingulate and MPFC after
15 months.
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
A neuropsychodynamic approach to depression may be
summarized as follows: the self and the changes in self-experience
are core dimensions in depression and of psychoanalytical
theories of depression. The experience of self-related depression
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can be characterized as the experience of the loss of the self. A
mechanism-based approach was developed, focussing on the
psychodynamic, psychological and neuronal mechanisms in
healthy and depressed persons. On the basis of empirical results
concerning emotional-cognitive interaction in depression,
neuropsychodynamic hypotheses of the self in depression were
developed.
In particular, it may be assumed that the empirically validated
increased resting state activity in depression is a pre-disposition
for the reactivation of experiences of early loss. The term
‘‘experiences of object loss’’ focuses not only on traumatic
relationship experiences, but also encompasses the loss of the
self in a significant relationship structure. Further, it may
be hypothesized that the resting state-stimulus-interaction in
depression is reduced because of the increased resting state
activity and that it corresponds with introjective processes of
the self in the relationship with objects (correlated with negative
emotions).
The increased resting state activity in depression is especially
associated with an increased resting state activity in the
DMN. By means of this, changes in the complete spatial
temporal structure of the intrinsic activity of the brain and
the disbalance between DMN and executive network (EN)
are induced. The reciprocal or negative interaction between
DMN and EN is shifted in the direction of the DMN. This
disbalance causes an abnormal increase in the internal mental
contents, whereas externally oriented actions are decreased.
The increased inward focus (with strong ruminations) and a
reduced outward focus (with a reduced relationship to the
outside world) are core symptoms in depression. The depressed
patient is no longer able to differentiate between external
stimuli and his own self (caused by the increased resting state
activity in the DMN which cannot be modified by external
stimuli).
The question of why adaptive mechanisms are activated in
the disturbed context of the increased resting state activity
may be answered by mentioning the central aim of these
neuropsychodynamic mechanisms: to maintain at all costs the
subjective existence of the self in view of the experienced threat
of loss of the self. It is neither lesions nor disturbances of adaptive
neuronal mechanisms which generate depressive symptoms, but
rather increasingly dysfunctional mechanisms of compensation
on the basis of the increased resting state activity.
As has been shown, different kinds of cognitive
symptoms in depression may be connected to different
neuropsychological functions, which in turn can be attributed
to different forms of processing in the prefrontal cortex.
These different forms of processing in the prefrontal
cortex can be characterized by spatiotemporal patterns of
neuronal activity, which are altered in a specific way during
depression. In depression, there is hypofunction in the medial
orbitofrontal cortex with consecutive changes in feedforward,
feedback and re-entrant processing in the prefrontal cortex,
anterior cingulate, DLPFC and VLPFC, respectively. The
changes in prefrontal processing in depression are mostly
related to an abnormal increase and synchronization in
feedforward processing from the VMPFC, as well as to the
resulting abnormal reduction of feedback and re-entrant
processing.
Psychotherapeutic interventions in depression should
focus on restoring these various forms of processing in the
prefrontal cortex. In this context, emotional, cognitional and
motor imagination, as well as working memory training,
chronometrically oriented cognitive therapy and awareness of
the time dimension play an important role in the psychotherapy
of depression. These various inputs, based on neurophysiological
mechanisms, could well complement existing psychotherapeutic
approaches such as Psychodynamic Psychotherapy, Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy (CBT), Interpersonal Therapy (IPT),
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) and Cognitive
Behavioral Analysis of Psychotherapy (CBASP). Considering
the cognitive phenomenology described above and the
underlying physiological mechanisms, new psychotherapeutic
approaches may be developed in the future on the basis of
the specific change in processing in the prefrontal cortex, in
the sense of ‘‘phenomenologically and physiologically based
neuropsychodynamic psychotherapy’’.
The role of attribution, i.e., the subjective interpretation of
events, has been widely studied within the context of depression
(for a recent review see Rubenstein et al., 2016). However,
neuropsychodynamic psychiatry (see Boeker and Northoff,
2018) encompasses a novel approach to psychopathology
and its psychodynamic dimensions. Neuropsychodynamic
psychiatry aims to complement and extend phenomenological
psychopathology beyond the phenomenal boundaries of
experience and thus towards the brain. Methodologically,
this requires two-fold access: the neuropsychodynamic
psychiatrist and psychoanalyst needs access to subjects’
experience while, at the same time, she/he requires access
to the brain’s spontaneous activity. Furthermore, the knowledge
about the neuropsychodynamic mechanisms of depression
may support the psychotherapist to recognize and use her/his
countertransference feelings for therapeutic interventions. In
the neuropsychodynamic approach to depression, therapeutic
relationship (empathy, countertransference, therapeutic alliance)
is of outstanding importance. In fact, one of the authors, HB,
underlined the importance of the therapeutic relationship in
the psychotherapy of depressed patients in a recent publication
(Boeker, 2017). We hope that the neuropsychodynamic
approach may assist the therapist/psychoanalyst perceiving,
considering, and understanding some of the specific
characteristics of the ‘‘affect communication’’ between the
depressed patient and the therapist, e.g., increased self-
focus, increased body-focus, agitation in the context of
resting state dysfunctions. Therefore, we underlined the
importance of the emotional attunement in psychoanalytic
psychotherapy of depressed patients and the adequate timing
of therapeutic interventions (see ‘‘Neuropsychodynamic
Approach to Treatment of Depression’’ section). The knowledge
on neurobiological/neuropsychodynamic mechanisms (e.g.,
increased resting state activity) may help the psychotherapist to
use her/his countertransference and to enable an appropriate
containmemt (especially in the beginning of the therapy) and
to adapt the therapeutical interventions in the long-time
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treatment course considering structural aspects of the
personality of the depressed patient. This is strongly supported
by recent evidence from therapeutic outcome studies in
major depression (Blatt et al., 2010; Zimmermann et al.,
2015) which showed that therapeutic relationship facilitates
changes in negative self-representation (‘‘introjective pole of
depressive psychopathology’’) and structural organization of
patients’ inter-personal schemas (‘‘anaclitic pole of depressive
psychopathology’’), leading to sustained therapeutic change.
Furthermore, semantic representations of the relationships
represent an important inter-individual process in the
therapeutic relationship and in the development of the patients’
capacities to regulate their emotional states through the
construction of the self, others and relationships. On this
way the therapeutic relationship is ‘‘a key tool for revisiting
impaired or distorted representations of the self and relational
objects’’ (Messina et al., 2016a). Some limitations of this
neuropsychodynamic approach to depression concern the
problem of investigating psychodynamic dimensions of
depression by means of operationalized studies (see Böker
and Northoff, 2010; Boeker et al., 2013). Further studies are
necessary to validate the increased resting state activity in
depression.
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